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a b s t r  a  c t
This article summarizes the major elements of the  ACA’s insurance reforms and how they
affect responsibility for making decisions about the health care that people receive. A  key
example of the  difficulty of allocating decision making responsibility is the effort to define
a  minimum benefit package for insurance plans, called essential health benefits. While the
ACA should achieve its  goal of near-universal access to care, it leaves in place a  multiplicity of
processes and decision-makers for determining individual treatment. As a  result, decisions
about  what care is provided are likely to remain, much as  they are today, divided among
government agencies, private insurers, private employers, and the  courts.
©  2014 Escola Nacional de  Saúde Pública. Published by  Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights
reserved.
A  distribuição da  responsabilidade  por  decisões  em  saúde  ao abrigo




Estados Unidos da América
Obamacare
Affordable Care Act
r e  s u m o
Este artigo resume os elementos principais das reformas no sistema de seguros de saúde
introduzidas pelo Affordable Care Act (ACA) nos EUA e discute como estas afetam a
distribuição  de responsabilidade pelas decisões ao nível da prestação de  cuidados de saúde.
Em  particular, o esforço de definição de  um pacote de benefícios mínimos nos planos de
seguros de saúde, denominado Essential Health Benefits, constitui um exemplo fundamen-
tal  da dificuldade de  atribuição e delimitação  de  responsabilidade pela tomada de decisão a
este  nível. Desta forma, enquanto o ACA procura atingir o seu objectivo de proporcionar um
acesso  o mais universal possível aos cuidados de  saúde por  parte da população americana,
deixa  no terreno uma multiplicidade de  processos e  decisores para a determinação de cada
tratamento individual. Em consequência, as decisões acerca dos cuidados de  saúde presta-
dos em cada situação permanecerão, provavelmente, a ser divididas pelas entidades que  já
 Portions of this article were first published in “Health Insurance Is  Dead, Long Live Health Insurance,” American Journal of Law &
Medicine, vol. 40, issues 2/3, pages 194–213, 2014. Copyright 2014 Wendy K. Mariner.
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hoje as  tomam na prática – agências governamentais, seguradoras privadas, empregadores
privados e tribunais.
©  2014 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. Todos os
direitos reservados.
On 23 March 2010, United States President Barack Obama
signed legislation that promises to bring the United States into
the community of nations that ensure access to health care for
all their citizens.1 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010, commonly known as  the Affordable Care Act or
ACA, is a lengthy statute – 974 pages – that reforms both public
and private health insurance, authorizes experiments to con-
trol costs and promote health, and funds multiple research
initiatives. The ACA’s best known and most controversial pro-
visions regulate the health insurance industry for the purpose
of making insurance available to almost all those residing in
the country. Much  of the controversy focused on whether the
federal government had the power to require individuals to
obtain health insurance.2 The United States Supreme Court
has held that the ACA is constitutional,3 but implementing the
ACA’s requirements is  raising questions about how to decide
what health care is actually provided in a reformed system.
This article summarizes the major elements of the ACA’s
insurance reforms and how they affect responsibility for mak-
ing decisions about the health care that people receive. A  key
example of the difficulty of allocating decision making respon-
sibility is the on-going effort to define a  minimum benefit
package for insurance plans, called essential health benefits.
I argue that this effort is laudable and necessary, but hampered
by both conceptual and practical obstacles. If such obsta-
cles cannot be overcome, the care that people get is  likely
to vary with the  particular type of public or private health
coverage they have. While the ACA should achieve its goal of
near-universal access to care, decisions about what exactly
care is provided are likely to remain, much as  they are today,
divided among government agencies, private insurers, private
employers, and the courts.
Health  insurance  reforms  under  the  Affordable
Care  Act
Access to health care in the US has long depended on having
health insurance coverage to pay for care.4 This is why, histor-
ically, efforts to expand access to health care have focused on
increasing not the direct provision of care, but eligibility for
public health benefit programs and private health insurance
plans.5–9 The Affordable Care Act’s primary goal, therefore, is
to enable all citizens and legal residents to obtain either public
or private health insurance.10
The ACA changes the regulation of health insurance in five
ways. First, it extends federal regulation to almost all private
health insurance companies. Historically, state governments
licensed and regulated private insurance of all kinds.11 The
federal government began to impose some requirements on
private group health insurance policies with the enactment
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, but did not establish federal licensure or extensive
regulation.12 The ACA still does not create federal licensure for
private insurers, but it does specify extensive requirements,
most importantly, the entirely new requirement that private
insurers must  sell (or issue) a policy to any person who  wants
to buy one (“guaranteed issue”), regardless of the person’s
health status or risks.1(1201) Related provisions forbid insur-
ers from excluding coverage for medical conditions that the
person already has, dropping coverage after a person gets
sick,1(1201) providing less coverage on the basis of mental
health conditions,1(1311) disability or age,1(1302) and placing
financial limits on benefits.1(1001) The ACA requires insurers
to spend at least 80 percent of their premiums on health care
for enrollees (the “medical loss ratio”).13 The federal govern-
ment will also provide financial assistance to  states to  improve
their ability to review insurance premium rates and enforce
compliance with the law.
These new requirements for insurers made the ACA’s
second insurance reform almost imperative: the “minimum
coverage” requirement that all citizens and lawful residents
obtain health insurance coverage or pay a  penalty.1(1501) In
a voluntary private insurance market where insurers are
required to cover anyone who wants a  policy, many individuals
would wait  until they became ill before buying insurance. This
could force insurers to charge unaffordably high premiums to
remain solvent. Requiring individuals to  buy insurance when
they are healthy provides sufficient revenues to charge rea-
sonable premiums to all. In effect, the  premiums operate like a
tax on individuals. There are exceptions to the minimum cov-
erage requirement (also known as  the  “individual mandate”)
for very low-income people who could not afford even other-
wise reasonable premiums, as  well as  individuals who do not
believe in medical care for religious reasons.
Individuals can obtain coverage from either public or pri-
vate programs, so coverage will be  distributed among many
different insurance systems. About 47.5 million people were
covered by Medicare, the federal health benefit program for
people over 65 and those with permanent disabilities, in
2010.14 An additional 9 million people were covered by other
federal government programs, such as  the Indian Health
Service, the  Department of Defense (for those in military
service), and the Veterans Administration Health Service
(for military veterans) in  2011.15 Almost 62.6 million people
are covered by Medicaid, a  federal program for low-income
populations, which is  funded by both the federal and state
governments and administered by the states pursuant to
federal standards.14,16 These government programs  covered
33.2 percent of the U.S. population.17 Private and government
employers who voluntarily offer group health insurance to
their employees enrolled about 155.5 million people in their
plans in 2011, representing 55.1 percent of the population.15
About 7 percent of Americans (18.9 million) purchased health
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insurance directly from insurance companies.15 These exist-
ing programs left about 49 million Americans (15.7% of the
population; nearly 18% of those under age 65) without insur-
ance in 2010.a The need to enable this uninsured population
to obtain coverage led to the other major insurance reforms.
The third reform is  the ACA’s requirement that health
insurance exchanges be established as a  sort of market-
place where individuals and small businesses can buy
insurance.1(1311) (Indeed, the new term for an exchange is
“marketplace.”) People who are currently uninsured and not
eligible for any other health plan can buy health insurance
through this exchange. (They are also free to  buy directly from
an insurance company.) The federal government will provide
subsidies (on a sliding scale) to individuals with incomes
between 100% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level to enable
them to pay the premiums.b Most of these exchanges be orga-
nized and run by the states, although the  federal government
has the authority to operate a  federal exchange in states that
fail to create their own.1(1311) The exchanges are primarily vir-
tual – a website with information about the different health
plans available, such as one that has existed in the state
of Massachusetts since 2007.18 The states are free to  decide
whether their exchanges will have legal authority to impose
requirements on health plans that are in addition to  the fed-
eral requirements noted above.19 This means that plans may
differ, especially in price, from state to state.
Currently, private employers have no legal obligation to
provide health insurance to their employees. The fourth
reform encourages private employers to do so. The ACA
imposes a relatively modest fee on large employers (with-
out health plans) whose employees receive a  federal
subsidy to buy insurance through the health insurance
marketplace.1(1513) The goal is to have employers reim-
burse the federal government for some of the  government’s
expenses in making insurance available, primarily to low-
wage employees. Small employers, who  often cannot were
to afford employee group health insurance, are exempt from
the penalty, but can receive a  tax credit for creating employee
health plans.1(1421)
The last reform addresses the rest of the  uninsured, who
cannot afford to buy insurance in a  health insurance mar-
ketplace, primarily because they are not eligible for federal
subsidies. This group included workers in private sector solo
or small businesses with fewer than 100 employees and non
U.S. citizens in 2011.14 The ACA amends the Medicaid statute
to make everyone with an income below 138% of the  Federal
Poverty Level eligible for  Medicaid health benefits.1(2001),18 The
federal government will pay for 100% of the cost of adding
this group to Medicaid, ultimately paying 90% by 2016. The US
Supreme Court held that the states are not obligated to com-
ply with this new eligibility standard,3 so many people living in
a Numbers add  to more than 100%, because some people are eli-
gible  for more than one program. For example, Medicaid covers
low-income elderly Medicare beneficiaries for nursing home care.
b Eligibility for government subsidies is often  based on the fed-
eral  poverty guidelines or level (FPL), amounts that  are updated
annually. For 2013, the FPL is US$ 11,490 for an  individual and
$23,550 for a family of four.
states that decide not to comply may  be left without affordable
coverage.
These insurance reforms were designed to move  at
about 20  million uninsured individuals into either Medicaid
(10 million) or private health insurance (10 million through a
health insurance exchange or employer plan).20 That would
leave uncovered only undocumented residents, people who
are exempt from the individual mandate, and those who
would rather pay a  penalty than buy insurance. With some
states opting out of the Medicaid expansion, federal actu-
aries now estimate that about 6 million fewer people than
originally estimated will become covered by Medicaid and
about 3 million more  than originally estimated will obtain
private coverage through exchanges.21 This would mean
that about 17  million people without insurance could be
covered.
Whatever the numbers turn out to be, when the ACA
becomes fully implemented, it should transform the Ameri-
can health insurance system, as complicated as it is, into one
that functions more like the social insurance systems in West-
ern European countries. With almost everyone in the system,
the US will face the kind of pressure that European countries
face to determine what health care all the different health
plans should cover.
Essential  health  benefits  under  the  ACA
The ACA attempts to create some uniformity in benefit cov-
erage in private insurance plans. The Act requires insurers to
cover “Essential Health Benefits” (EHB) in  all plans that they
offer to sell on a health insurance exchange or in the individual
and small group market (but excluding grandfathered plans
of large employers).22 EHB benefits must be similar in scope
to a “typical employer plan” and must include the following
ten categories of medical services: ambulatory; emergency;
in-patient hospitalization; maternity and newborn; mental
health and substance abuse; prescription drugs; rehabilita-
tion; laboratory; preventive; and pediatric (including oral and
vision care).1(1302) The federal Secretary of Health and Human
Services is charged with defining EHB, and is required to take
the following specific “considerations” into account. 1(1302) The
categories must be  balanced, without giving undue weight
to  any one. Coverage should not discriminate on the basis
of age, disability or  expected length of life. EHB should take
into account the needs of diverse groups, including women,
children and people with disabilities. Benefits should not be
denied on the basis of age, expected length of life, present or
predicted disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality
of life.
This general definition of EHB is quite comprehensive, and
the “considerations” make it difficult to narrow the categories
or to  make decisions about how they might apply to individual
patients. Not surprisingly, the Secretary has avoided trying to
list specific benefits. Instead, on 25 February 2013, she issued a
rule granting the  states the opportunity to decide what bene-
fits plans will cover in their states.23 A state may  choose one of
several existing health plans sold to small employers in that
state (called a  “benchmark plan”), and the benefits covered
by that plan will be  deemed to qualify as  EHB. However, the
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benchmark plan must be supplemented if  it fails to cover any
of the 10 required categories.20
The decision to consider the terms of existing small
employer plans as covering EHB is both understandable and
disappointing. It had the advantage of allowing insurers to
meet the 2013 deadline for submitting plans to the exchanges
without having to develop entirely new plans. (Plans that take
effect after 31 December 2013 must cover EHB.) It also provides
some continuity for individuals and small businesses that are
already covered by existing plans. At the same time, it fails
to critically analyze whether these benchmark plans actually
cover essential health benefits.
While ACA states that essential health benefits should be
similar in scope to the benefits covered by a “typical employer
plan,” it does not distinguish between large employer plans
and small employer plans. Small employer plans typically
offer fewer benefits and more  limited coverage of those ben-
efits than large employer plans in order to keep premiums
affordable. A small group of enrollees can be subject to
large variations in risk from year to year. To counter ris-
ing premiums, companies have increased the amounts that
employees pay for health plans – both the employee’s share
of premiums and deductibles and co-payments for receiv-
ing care. Thus, a typical small employer plan usually has
a lower actuarial value than a large employer plan. More-
over, a small employer may  have few affordable choices,
so its plan may  not cover the benefits that employees
prefer.
Since the majority of people who  will be entering the
market are individuals and employees of small businesses,
it makes some sense to use a small business plan as
a benchmark. However, insurers can combine these new
“consumers” into larger pools resembling large employer
groups offering better coverage at lower prices. This sug-
gests that if  the  benchmark plan is  to  set the standard
for EHB, it  should offer better coverage than today’s typi-
cal small employer plan. Arguably, however, this puts the
cart before the horse. The Secretary should define EHB
first. Then insurers could design plans to cover those
benefits.
Essential  health  benefits  – conceptual  questions
What counts as essential care is a  question that has vexed
policy makers for decades.24 A  threshold question is: essen-
tial for whom? An individual’s view of what is essential
care may differ from a  societal perspective. Moreover, dif-
ferent individuals may  have different opinions on what is
essential. Some may  value quality of life more  than length
of life, while others prefer the opposite.25 Some may  prefer
care that maintains or restores normal function, while oth-
ers simply want to survive, regardless of disability.26 Some
may think of health care as limited only to  services that
diagnose, treat or cure disease, while others may  include ser-
vices to prevent illness or even achieve optimal health status.
Furthermore, an individual’s own view may  vary, depend-
ing upon whether she is answering as  a consumer buying
insurance or a  patient in  need of care for herself or a  loved
one.27
Societal level views of essential care also vary.c Indeed,
one could question whether some societies accurately or
adequately represent any consensus on the part of their popu-
lations. Where governments act honestly, EHB could properly
be based on many different factors, such as population size,
age distribution, and available resources. What is essential to
any society may  also depend on its need for economic growth,
which may  favor services that preserve productivity, or  partic-
ipation in civic life, which may  favor other services, or some
other human function. But, even the best-intentioned societal
definition may  conflict in whole or in part with the views of
individuals or groups within the population.
This variation in possible definitions suggests that one size
will not fit all. Perhaps the Secretary should not be faulted
for devolving responsibility for  defining EHB to the  states. At
the same time, state-level decisions may  prove unsuitable for
their own target populations, while prolonging inconsistency
across states.
Essential  health  benefits  –  practical  problems
Paradoxically, variation in EHB definitions can perpetuate a
problem that the EHB requirement itself was intended to
resolve. Historically, the fact that different insurers covered
different benefits meant that people with the same medical
condition would not necessarily receive the same treatment.
The variation among the several public benefit programs and
hundreds of private insurance plans can provoke complaints
of unfair rationing, especially if a person who is denied treat-
ment believes that the denial was not based on medical need,
but on an  insurer’s profit targets.28,29 More uniform coverage
of the same benefits could avoid the rationing charge by assur-
ing that everyone is  subject to the same rules. The knowledge
that resources are being used for a  public purpose, such as pro-
viding needed education or services for children, can increase
public acceptance of limits as a shared sacrifice. On one hand,
the breadth of the statutory definition of EHB  will make it dif-
ficult to limit the  total package of benefits. On the  other hand,
the Secretary’s decision to use state-based benchmark plans
to define EHB means that the details of each benefit category
will continue to  vary, so that individuals can still complain of
unfair treatment, thereby threatening public acceptance.
Although a  major impetus for the Act was the growing cost
of care,30 the ACA does not expressly require either reductions
or changes in the method of payment for health care. Instead,
supporters believe that, once everyone is insured, the country
will have no choice but to take affirmative steps to control
costs. Since most of the  ACA’s reforms do not take effect until
2014, noticeable cost control is unlikely for many  years. For  the
c Such challenges confront the National Health Service in the
United Kingdom, for example, which has not  defined the meaning
of “a comprehensive health service.” As discussed by  C.  Newdick
in Health care rights and NHS rationing: turning theory into practice,  in
this issue, interpretation is delegated to local health authorities,
resulting in the risk of “post-code” rationing, in which different
health authorities make different decisions about the same issues.
NICE was created to smooth out some of these differences, but the
challenge remains.
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next several years, and probably much longer, the  rising cost
of care will significantly affect the kind of care that insurance
covers.
In practice, insurers still bear primary responsibility for
controlling costs, but their options are limited. In principle,
insurers could reduce their own administrative costs and
profits, but for-profit companies are under pressure from
investors to increase profits.31 One ACA skeptic argues that
the ACA’s requirement that insurers spend at least 80% of
premiums on benefits could backfire by encouraging insur-
ers to increase premiums and cover more  services for the
purpose of preserving executive compensation and profit
levels.32 The requirement that insurers cover EHB, however
defined, constrains insurers’ ability to  limit benefits as a way
to control costs. The ACA also limits the permissible extent
of cost-sharing for patients, another traditional way to  shift
costs.1((1302(c))
This leaves payments to providers as  the primary target
for cost control. There is  little dispute that such payments
have grown faster than the cost of living or that most provider
prices can appear to be arbitrary.33 The ACA authorizes exper-
iments to encourage providers to work together to provide
care more  efficiently at lower prices. So  far, similar exper-
iments have mixed results. Moreover, providers have little
incentive to reduce their own incomes. More than 20 years
ago, Congress enacted a law requiring Medicare to reduce
payments to physicians, but under pressure from physicians
Congress has repeatedly delayed enforcement of that law,
including in  2013.34 If  enforced, the law would have required
a reduction in physician payments of more  than 26  percent in
2013.35
These practical problems suggest that the process of defin-
ing essential health benefits is not likely to dramatically
change insurance benefits beyond what the  ACA mandates
in its other provisions. Most insurance plans and benefit
programs define benefits in quite general terms, much like
the statutory definition of EHB. The question, then, remains:
exactly which services are included and excluded in each cat-
egory?
Essential  health  benefits  –  who  decides?
While the ACA intends to provide more  uniform coverage of
Essential Health Benefits, the decisions most important to
patients – what treatment will his  or her own insurance pay for
– remain with the insurer for the foreseeable future. Because
the US has so many  different insurance plans, both the deci-
sion maker and the law governing the determination of claims
for treatment also vary.
Federal government programs  like Medicare prescribe
general benefit categories in legislation, but specific deter-
minations on whether and when specific items and services
are covered are a matter of administrative law. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid, (CMS) issue regulations and guidance interpre-
ting the statute and describing what will and will not be  paid
for. However, the federal agency CMS  does not make decisions
about individual patient care. Instead, CMS  contracts with pri-
vate contractors to do so on behalf of the federal government.
Typically, these contractors are insurance companies, which
have experience handling claims, usually because they have
a  separate private insurance business of their own. Different
contractors handle claims in  different regions of the country,
so it is  possible to  have inconsistency in  claims determina-
tion. In the case of disputes, patients have a  statutory right
to  appeal the denial of payment to  Medicare’s administrative
appeals process, which is a  unified federal system with greater
consistency in results.
Medicaid benefit determinations are more  complicated.
Although Medicaid is a federal program with legislatively pre-
scribed benefit categories, the states administer the program
and can voluntarily cover some additional benefits. Most state
Medicaid programs make individual patient care determina-
tions directly through a  state Medicaid administrative agency.
However, most states also contract with private insurers to
enroll some Medicaid beneficiaries in a managed care plan.
The insurer makes the initial benefit coverage determination
for beneficiaries enrolled in its Medicaid plan. Disputes, how-
ever, are subject to a  state’s administrative agency review,
often with a  dedicated appeals board.
Contract law governs individual benefit determinations for
patients who are enrolled in private insurance plans. There
are no uniform national rules, because contract law is within
state common law jurisdiction, but state laws  tend to be sim-
ilar. Claims determination often depends on specific contract
provisions, especially those that exclude experimental pro-
cedures and those that limit coverage to treatments that are
medically necessary for the individual patient.29,36
Most private insurers provide internal review (conducted
by the insurer itself) of enrollee complaints, including disputes
over benefit denials, and the ACA requires almost all insurers
to  offer a  more  transparent internal review process covering
more  categories of complaints. Enrollees who are dissatisfied
with the internal review decision have very different options,
depending upon their particular insurer and plan.
In theory, patients can sue a private insurer under state
law for claims denials and other causes of action. However,
the role of courts in determining claims has  diminished some-
what in  the past decade, for several reasons. Perhaps the most
important has been the  growing use of mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in private insurance contracts, which preclude
an  enrollee from bringing a  lawsuit to require payment for
treatment or to recover damages for negligence or other vio-
lations of law.37 The U.S. Supreme Court has also limited the
causes of action available to patients who are enrolled in an
employer’s group health plan.38,39 Patients in  such plans who
claim wrongful denial of benefits must sue the employer’s plan
under federal law, not state contract law.40 If successful, the
patients are entitled to recover only the cost of the  treatment
denied and not any damages for personal injury.
A third reason for fewer court actions is the growth of exter-
nal review systems. Almost all states now require insurers
to  submit certain disputes to a  review panel that is entirely
independent of the  insurer. Having one’s claim reviewed by
an  unbiased expert or group of experts often satisfies patients
that their claims have been evaluated fairly, regardless of the
outcome. The ACA greatly expands the use of external review
panels, requiring their use for almost all insurers, except cer-
tain employer-sponsored group health plans.41
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The ACA leaves in place a  multiplicity of processes and
decision-makers for determining individual claims, including
public administrative procedures, private review procedures,
private arbitration, and judicial process. The legislation does
not specify how decisions are made in individual cases. With
rising health care costs, both public and private insurers are
likely to face pressure to make sure that they pay only for care
that offers value for money.42,43 Thus, different decision mak-
ers may continue to produce different interpretations of what
individual patients are entitled to under their different health
plans. Even where courts issue opinions, their decisions often
focus on the specific circumstances of an individual patient
and therefore create little precedent for other individual deci-
sions.
Conclusion
The ACA is intended to provide near-universal health insur-
ance coverage for the purpose of enabling Americans to obtain
needed medical care. It is also intended to bring greater con-
sistency to health insurance coverage by regulating the terms
of most insurance plans. The requirement that private health
insurance plans sold on the new health insurance exchanges
cover essential health benefits is a  major step toward greater
consistency in coverage across the population. However, that
requirement does not apply to  all health plans, and the current
definition of essential health benefits lacks specification.
As a result, decisions about covered care at the patient level
will continue to be made by many different decision makers,
just as they are now.  Each decision maker, whether public or
private, will continue to interpret – according to different rules
–  whether the general categories of benefits include something
that a provider recommends or a  patient seeks. The ACA has
begun to face, but has not solved, the very difficult question
of the limits of care.
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